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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
fOr Preparation of FMEA and CIL. i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Pyrotechnics hardware.
The IOA analysis process utilized available Pyrotechnics hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the 5 major subdivisions of Pyrotechnics. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number
1/1
27
2/IRII 2/2 n 3_IR13 3/2R0 3/30 [ TOTAL41
4
w
w
PYROTECHNICS ANALYSIS SUMMARY
CRtT ,_FM ,_PCI
1/1 27 27
2/1R 11 11
2/2 3 3
3/1R 0 0
3/2R 0 0
3/3 0 0
TOTAL 41 41
BIB
IB
BIB
BB
i
BB
__ELERATION
_IT -_FM ,.-_PCI
111 7 7
2tl R 2 2
2/2 0 0
3_R 0 0
3_R 0 0
3_ 0 0
_T_ 9 9
_3V(_S_DAR
CRIT #FM #PCI
1/1 4 4
2/1R 2 2
2/2 2 2
3tlR 0 0
3/2R 0 0
3/3 0 0
TOTAL 8 8
CREW _A_ON & EQUIPMENT
CRIT #FM #PCI
__ SEPARA_ON
CRIT #FM #PCI
1/1 9 9
2tlR 3 3
212 0 0
3_R 0 0
3_R 0 0
3/3 0 0
TOTAL 12 12
t
P/LRETEN310N/O EPLOY
CRIT #FM #PCI
1[I 2 2
2/1R 4 4
2/2 0 0
3/1R 0 0
3/2R 0 0
3/3 0 0
TOTAL 6 6
1/1 5 5
2/1R 0 0
2/2 1 1
3/1 R 0 0
3/2R 0 0
3/3 0 0
TOTAL 6 6
Figure I - PYROTECHNICS OVERVIRW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number
2/IR 2/2
ii 3 3/IR0 3_2R I TOTAL41
L
L =
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The, 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approaah
The independent analysis approach is a top'down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Pyrotechnics Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Pyrotechnics ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
Space Shuttle Orbiter Pyrotechnics are defined as the devices and
assemblies operated by solid propellants or explosive devices.
The Pyrotechnics addressed in this study are those that are used
in the following applications. The Pyrotechnics used as the
primary method for separation of the External Tank from the
Orbiter. The Pyrotechnics used for assist and backup devices for
Landing Gear deployment. The Pyrotechnics employed as emergency
devices to guillotine and jettis0n the Remo£e Manipulator Arm,
guillotine and release the Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna, and
separate the outer window and open the inner window for ground
emergency egress.
i. Landing/Deceleration Systems Pyrotechnics are employed in
the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Uplock Release, Main Landing
Gear (MLG) Uplock Release, and the NLG Extension Thruster.
Pyrotechnic uplock thrusters serve as backup to the
Hydraulic Deployment System for the NLG and the MLG prior
to landing and are used only if the primary hydraulic
system fails. The pyrotechnic NLG Extension thruster is
used to provide mechanical assist to initiate nose gear
and nose gear door movement against opposing air loads
and are fired every flight whether needed or not.
2. Orbiter/External Tank (ET) Separation Mechanisms
employ pyrotechnic devices as the primary method tO
separate the ET from the Orbiter at one forward (fwd) and
two aft attach points and to disconnect the Liquid
Hydrogen (LH2) and the Liquid Oxygen (LO2) umbilical
plates. The fwd structural attach point is separated by
fracture of a single Fwd Attach Shear Bolt. The aft
structural attach points are separated by fracture of
their respective Aft Attach Frangible Nut. The umbilical
plates are separated by fracturing six frangible nuts.
3. Payload Retention and Deploy Jettison Pyrotechnics are
used to guillotine the cables and jettison the remote
manipulator arm and arm support bracket in the event
the normal retraction stowage mechanism fails and the
arm interferes with payload bay door closure for safe
deorbit.
4. Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna Emergency Release
Pyrotechnics are provided to release the structural
attachment and sever the cable in the event the normal
RR Antenna stowage mechanism fails and emergency release
RR Antenna is necessary to permit payload bay door
closure.
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3.1 Design and Function (cont'd)
5. Crew Station and Equipment Ground Emergency Egress
Pyrotechnics are employed to break the attach bolts to
sever the outer window and to open the inner window•
Window severence can be initiated from either the
interior of the crew compartment or the exterior right
hand side for ground crew use. The system would only
be utilized if a failure occurs that requires crew
egress and the entry door is jammed.
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InterZaces and Locations
The Landing/Deceleration Pyrotechnics interface with the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C) Subsystem
at the Nasa Standard initiators (NSIs) via the Pyro
Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of the
pyrotechnic devices• The pyrotechnics interface
mechanically with the NLG and MLG Uplock Release Mechanisms
to provide backup to the Hydraulic Deployment System and to
provide assist to the NLG to initiate Nose Gear/Door
movement against opposing air loads•
The Orbiter/ET Separation Pyrotechnics interface with the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C) Subsystem
at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the Pyro
Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of the
pyrotechnic devices to effect Orbiter/ET separation upon
command. The pyrotechnics interface at one fwd and two aft
attach points that structurally attach the elements and also
at the LO2 and LH2 umbilical plates•
The RMS Guillotine and Jettision Pyrotechnics interface with
the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
Subsystem at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the
Pyro Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of
the pyrotechnic devices to sever the electrical cable and
release the manipulator arm and arm support bracket if
required. The pyrotechnics interface physically with the
RMS at the base and at the three Manipulator Positioning
Mechanisms (MPMs).
The RRAntenna Guillotine and Release Pyrotechnics interface
with the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
Subsystem at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the
Pyro Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of
the pyrotechnic devices to sever the electrical cable and
effect non-propulsive emergency release of the RR Antenna.
The pyrotechnics interface mechanicallly with the RRAntenna
at the antenna structural attach point.
i
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations (contWd)
o The Crew Station and Equipment Pyrotechnics interface with a
T-handle in the crew compartment and another on the exterior
right hand side, either of which can be used to fire a
mechanical initiator to blow away the outer panel and open
the inner window panel for emergency crew egress. A stowed
prybar is provided to force open the inner window if
required.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the Pyrotechnics hardware
and the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 9
comprise the detailed system representation.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the five major subdivisions
of the Orbiter Pyrotechnics. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
Landing Sys
Orb/ET Sep
RR Ant Rel
P/L Retn/Depl
Crew Sta Eq
TOTAL
i/i
7
9
4
5
2
27
2/IR
2
3
2
0
4
11
2/2
0
0
2
1
0
3/IR
0
0
0
0
0
0
3/2R
0
0
0
0
0
0
3/3 TOTAL
0 9
0 12
0 8
0 6
0 6
0 41
Of the 41 failure modes analyzed, 38 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and 3 were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the potential critical
items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross
reference between each potential critical item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
_u_w
I TABLE II
Criticality:
TOTAL:
+
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR I 3/2R TOTAL
27 Ii 3 0 1 0 41
w
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4.1 Analysis Results - Landing/Deceleration System
Pyrotechnics
The Orbiter Landing/Deceleration System uses pyrotechnics in
the Nose Landing Gear for uplock release as backup to the
hydraulic system and as assist (every mission whether needed or
not) for nose gear extension. Pyrotechnics are used in the
Main Landing Gear for uplock release as backup to the hydraulic
system. The backup functions are initiated one second after the
down Push Button Indicator (PBI) is activated if the hydraulic
system has failed to lower the landing gear. There are nine (9)
pyrotechnic failure modes identified for this system. Of these,
seven (7) are Criticality i/I and two (2) are Criticality 2/IR.
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4.2 Analysis Results - Orbiter/ET Separation Mechanisms
Pyrotechnics
The Orbiter/ET Separation Mechanisms employs Pyrotechnics as the
prime method of separation of the two elements. The Orbiter is
separated at the fwd attach point by a pyrotechnic separation
bolt that includes a single piston and dual pressure cartridges
that are fired to shear the attach bolt. The two aft attach
points are separated by fracture of its respective single
frangible nut. Each frangible nut has two booster cartridges and
two detonator cartridges either of which is adequate to fraqture
the nut. The two umbilical plates are each disconnected by means
of three frangible nuts with each nut having two detonator
cartridges. There are twelve (12) pyrotechnic failure modes
identified for this system. Of these, nine (9) are Criticality
I/I and three (3) are Criticality 2/IR.
4.3 Analysis Results - Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna Release
Pyrotechnics
The Rendezvous Radar Antenna can be jettisoned to permit payload
bay door closure if the normal stowage mechanism fails. The
pyrotechnic sustem releases the structural attachment and severs
the umbilical. The guillotine_an_ releasenuteach have dual
pressure cartridges such that successful firing of one of the
cartridges is adequate to cause the device to function. There
are eight (8) pyrotechnic failure modes identified for this
system. Of these, four (4) are Criticality I/I; two (2) are
Criticality 2/IR; and two (2) are Criticality 2/2.
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4.4 Analysis Results - Payload Retention and Deploy Jettison
Pyrotechnics
The Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Pyrotechnics are emergency
separation devices that consist of four separate subsystems that
release the Remote Manipulator Arm and the three Manipulator
Positioning/Retention Mechanisms (MPMs). The guillotine with the
dual pressure cartridges and one of the retractors is located on
the sill longeron, at the base of the RMS. Their purpose is to
sever the RMS electrical wire bundle and release the RMS
mechanically. The remaining three guillotine devices and
retractors are mounted on the three MPMs. Their purpose is to
sever the control cable to the Manipulator Retention Latch (MRL)
and to mechanically release the MPM at the designated separation
plane to allow closure of the Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs). There
are six (6) pyrotechnic FMEAs indentified for this system. Of
these, five are criticality I/i and one (i) is criticality 2/2.
4.5 Analysis Results - Crew Station Emergency Egress System
Pyrotechnics
Crew Station and Equipment Emergency Egress System Pyrotechnics
are employed to break the attach bolts to sever the outer window
and to open the inner window. Window severence can be initiated
from either the interior of the crew compartment or the exterior
right hand side for ground crew use. The system would only be
utilized if a failure occurs that requires crew egress and the
entry door is jammed. There are six pyrotechnic FMEAs identified
for this system. Of these, two (2) are criticality i/i and four
(4) are criticality 2/IR.
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35. VO70-5653_6, Rockwell Drawing, Curtain Closeout, ET
umbilical Plate, LO2, Assembly of, Rev C-03,
Jun 13, 1986
36. V070-585227, Rockwell Drawing, Clamp Set - Support,
Two Lines, Rev 7, Nov 7, 1975
37.
38.
VO72-555215, Rockwell Drawing, Pyrotechnic and Cover
Installation - Orbiter / External Tank, Aft Attach /
Separation System Rev D-03, Mar 3, 1987
VO72-555369, Rockwell Drawing, Wire Harness
Installation - ET / Orbiter, Umbilical Hold Down /
Release, Rev E-01, Jan 23, 1983
39. VO72-565201, Rockwell Drawing, Fastener Installation -
Orbiter / External Tank, Aft Attach / Separation
System, Rev D-05, Feb 27, !987
40. VO72-565249, Rockwell Drawing, Stopper - Orbiter /
External Tank, Aft Attach - Separation System, Rev
A-03, May 19, 1982
41. V072-565370, Rockwell Drawing, Mechanical / Pyrotechnic
Installation - ET / Orbiter Umbilical Hold Down /
Release, Rev D-10, Aug 7, 1986
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42. VO72-565450, Rockwell Drawing, Stud - Orbiter / ET
Umbilical Hold Down / Release, Assembly of, Rev A-05,
Aug 31, 1981
43. VS27-415267, Rockwell Drawing, Disconnect Assembly -
LH2, ET Half, Rev D-03, Mar 18, 1986
44. VS27-415273, Rockwell Drawing, Disconnect Assembly -
LO2, ET Half, Rev D-02, Mar 20, 1986
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ACRONYNS and ABBREVIATIONS
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W
m
AC
AOA
Ant
ATO
BFS
CIL
Ckt
Cont'd
Cur
Depl
DC
EPD&C
Eq
ET
F
FMC
FMEA
FPC
Func
Fwd
Guill
Herm
HW
Hz
IOA
Jett
LH2
Lim
LO2
MDAC
MDM
MLG
MPM
MRL
- Alternating Current
- Abort Once Around
- Antenna
- Abort To Orbit
- Backup Flight Software
- Critical Items List
- Circuit
- Continued
- Current
- Deploy
- Direct Current
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Equipment
- External Tank
- Functional
- Forward Motor Controller
- Failure Mode Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Functional
- Forward
- Guillotine
- Hermetically
- Hardware
- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Analysis
- Jettison
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Limiting
- Liquid Oxygen
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Landing Gear
- Manipulator Positioning Mechanixm
- Manipulator Retention Mechanism
A-I
NA
NASA
NLG
NSI
NSP
NSTS
OAO
Orb
P
PASS
PBM
PCI
PIC
P/L
PLBD
Pos
Pyro
Rel
Retn
RMS
RR
RTLS •
Sep
Sta
STS
Sys
TAL
ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS (Cont' d)
- Not applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear
- NASA Standard Initiator
- NASA Standard Detonator
- National Space Transportation System
- Once-Around-Abort
- Orbiter
- Pass
- Primary Avionics Systems Software
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Potential critical Item
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Payload
- Payload Bay Door
- Position
- Pyrotechnic
- Release
- Retention
- Remote Manipulator System
- Rendezvous Radar
- Return-To-Launch-Site
- Separation
- Station
- Space Transportation System
- System
- Trans-Atlantic-Landing (Abort Landing)
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
L_
B-1
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE_ - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
- Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
pHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
_FTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
0NORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/$A_ING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTs 22206, Instructions for
Preparat_o_ of FMEA/CIL, 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
io
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task•
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task•
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS m
B.3 Pyrotechnics,Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Pyrotechnic devices in the Orbiter Landing Systems,
Orbiter/ET Separation System, RMS Guillotine and Jettison System,
Rendezvous Radar Release System, and the Ground Emergency Egress
System• The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
i. Component age life was not considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the scope
of this task.
.
•
.
Criticality of emergency system failure modes were
established on the basis of the effect of the first
failure of the emergency system on the crew or vehicle.
RATIONALE: Regardless of the number of failures that
would have to occur before the emergency
system would be required, its purpose is
to accomplish its intended task without
fail under emergency conditions• Emergency
systems are not employed unless there is
an emergency condition in existence•
Criticality of backup system pyrotechnic failures were
established with the same approach as emergency systems.
RATIONALE: The backup pyrotechnics involved in this
analysis are employed only (albeit
automatically) after failure of the
primary system, as in the Landing
Gear deployment, therefore all previous
failures are discounted in the Criticality
assignmentS.
Premature or inadvertent operation of pyrotechnic
devices is considered to be the highest criticality.
RATIONALE: Uncommanded operation by a pyrotechnic
device would be catastrophic particularly
when involved in separation of Shuttle
elements and premature deployment of
landing gear. Premature operation of
emergency or backup pyrotechnics could
likewise cause unpredictable results•
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• Failure modes were limited to failure of the component
or assembly to function as intended and inadvertent
or premature uncommanded operation.
RATIONALE: Whether the cause of the failure of a
pyrotechnic device to function as intended
to accomplish an action be a failure to
fire, fire with insufficient force, or low
pressure output, the result would be
essentially the same. Failures of other
systems that cause inadvertent operation
of the pyrotechnic devices covered in this
analysis are not considered a failure of
the pyrotechnic device itself. If a
switch fails and causes a command to be
issued to fire a pyrotechnic device, the
failure lies with the switch•
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED _ALYS I S
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Pyrotechnics subsystem. The information on
these worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written
by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the
item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the
function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell
Desk Instructions 100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
n
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 m Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P _ Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
=
C-I
LINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER ASSY
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST" W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
i) LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER
4) THRUSTER ASSY
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0019-0001, SKD26100!02-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: .........
FAILURE TO EXTEND ONE MAIN LANDING GEAR DURING LANDING (INCLUDING
ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
THE INITIATORS ARE REDUNDANT THEREFORE NORMAL OPERATION OF EITHER
SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE RELEASE ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND
THE MAIN LANDING GEAR.
REFE_ALSOTO IOA FMEA 21102.
REFERENCES: MC325-0019
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT :........ i/i
ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MAIN LANDING GEAR
PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(SINGLE CARTRIDGE - DUAL INITIATORS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0019-0002, SKD26100102-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO EXTEND ONE MAIN LANDING GEAR DURING LANDING (INCLUDING
ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
THE INITIATORS ARE REDUNDANT THEREFORE NORMAL OPERATION OF EITHER
SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE RELEASE ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND
THE MAIN LANDING GEAR.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 21102.
REFERENCES: MC325-0019
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 4603 ABORT: I/I
ITEM: PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER ASSY
4) PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
5) (SINGLE CARTRIDGE - DUAL INITIATORS)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/!
LIFTOFF: I/I TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0019-0002, SKD26100102-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
PREMATURE EXTENTION OF MAIN LANDING GEAR COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW DURING ASCENT, ABORT AND DEORBIT. COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND PO_LYNLOS_ OF CR_ON_BTTIF
RESCUE WERE NOT POSSIBLE.
INADVERTENT FIRING OF EITHER OF THE DUAL INITIATORS WOULD SUFFICE
TO OPERATE THE PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE ASSY THEREFORE CRIT 1 IS
APPLICABLE.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 21101.
REFERENCES: MC325-0019
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER ASSY
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER ASSY
THRUSTER ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEO RBIT: 2/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100101-201
CAUSES: MEcHANICAL/sTRU_t _ MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR DURING LANDING (INCLUDING
ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
THE INITIATORS ARE REDUNDANT THEREFORE NORMAL OPERATION OF EITHER
SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE RELEASE ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND
THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 11102.
REFERENCES: MC325-0006, VO70-51550
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE C_TRIDGE
FAILS TO OPERATE
- s
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(SINGLE CARTRIDGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100101-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ _ _
FAILURE TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR DURING LANDING (INCLUDING
ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
THE_IN_TIATORSARE RED_DANT THEREFORE NQ_L OPERAT!ONOFEITHE R
SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE RELEASE ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND
THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 11102.
REFERENCES: MC325-0006, VO70-51550
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(SINGLE CARTRIDGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100101-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE EXTENTION OF NOSE WHEEL GEAR COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW DURING ASCENT, ABORT AND DEORBIT. COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF CREW ON-ORBIT IF RESCUE WERE
NOT POSSIBLE.
INADVERTENT FIRING OF EITHER OF THE DUAL INITIATORS WOULD SUFFICE
TO OPERATE THE THRUSTER ASSY OF THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR PYRO UPLOCK
RELEASE ASSY THEREFORE CRIT 1 IS APPLICABLE.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA iii01.
REFERENCES: MC325-0006, V070-510550, VO70-552002
= REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER ASSY
FAIL TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO GEAR EXTENSION ASSIST THRUSTER ASSY
THRUSTER ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100100-205
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/_T_O_A_:
FAILURE TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR IN TIME DURING LANDING
(INCLUDING ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
THE INITIATORS ARE REDUNDANT THEREFORE NORMAL OPERATION OF EITHER
INITIATOR SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE GEAR EXTENSION
ASSIST TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 11202,
REFERENCES". MC325-0006
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/e7
PYROTECHNICS
4608
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAIL TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO GEAR EXTENSION ASSIST THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(SINGLE CARTRIDGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: " I/i
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION'.
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100101-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSIONr
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR IN TIME DURING LANDING
(INCLUDING ABORT LANDING SITUATIONS) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
THE INITIATORS ARE REDUNDANT THEREFORE NORMAL OPERATION OF EITHER
INITIATOR SHOULD EFFECT NORMAL OPERATION OF THE GEAR EXTENSION
ASSIST TO EXTEND THE NOSE WHEEL GEAR.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 11202.
REFERENCES: MC325-0006
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
NOSE WHEEL GEAR
PYRO GEAR EXTENSION ASSIST THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(SINGLE CARTRIDGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0001, SKD26100101-201
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRO_NT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS_RATIONA'=:/_._ _
PREMATURE EXTENTION OF MAIN LANDING GEAR COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/C_WDURING ASCENT, A_QRT_D DEORBIT. COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND POSSIBLY _SS OF CREW ON'_RBIT :fF .....' .
RESCUE WERE NOT POSSIBLE.
INADVERTENT FIRING OF EITHER OF THE DUAL INITIATORS WOULD SUFFICE
TO OPERATE THE THRUSTER ASSY OF THE PYRO-GEAR EXTENSION ASSIST
THEREFORE CRIT 1 IS APPLICABLE.
REFER ALSO TO IOA FMEA 11201.
REFERENCES: MC325-0006
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT :
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/i
ITEM: SHEAR BOLT
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE BOLT FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
FORWARD SEPARATION
SHEAR BOLT
(i PER SHUTTLE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0014-0007, SKD26100098-245
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE FRACTURE OF THE FWD SEPARATION BOLT OR THE MONOBALL
WOULD SEPARATE THE ORBITER STRUCTURALLY FROM THE ET AT THE FWD
ATTACH POINT•
PREMATURE STRUCTURAL SEPARATION OF THE ORBITER AND ET WOULD
PRODUCE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS FROM UNCONTROLLED FORCES BEING
APPLIED IN UNCONTROLLED DIRECTIONS WHICH COULD TEAR APART THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES: MC325-0014
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-ll
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii123187
PYROTECHNICS
4652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
i/i
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR BOLT
FAIL TO FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
FORWARD SEPARATION
SHEAR BOLT
(i PER SHUTTLE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0014-0007, SKD26100098-245
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE FWD ATTACH BOLT TO FRACTURE UPON SEPARATION
COMMAND WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM
THE ET. _....... ....
FAILURE OF ABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM THE ET WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC325-0014
I
m
B
i
g
I
m
m
i
g
i
I
m
m
m
m
I
i
g
m
m
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-!2
m
b
m
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/57
PYROTECHNICS
4653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT.
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAIL TO FUNCTION OR LOW PRESSURE OR REDUCED
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
FORWARD SEPARATION
SHEAR BOLT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(2 PER BOLT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0014-0008, SKD26100098-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE PRESSURE CARTRIDGE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IF THE
OTHER FUNCTIONED PROPERLY SINCE THEY ARE DUAL REDUNDANT.
FAILURE OF BOTH REDUNDANT PRESSURE CARTRIDGES WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM THE ET.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM THE ET WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. WHETHER THE FAILURE TO EFFECT PROPER
SEPARATION IS CAUSED BY THE DETONATOR, PRESSURE CARTRIDGE, OR THE
BOLT, THE RESULT WOULD BE THE SAME.
REFERENCES: MC325-0014
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-13
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
FORWARD SEPARATION
SHEAR BOLT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
(2 PER BOLT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/i RTLS: I/!
LiFTOFF: i/l TAL: i/I'
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
Z
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0014-0008, SKD26100098-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE OPERATION OF EITHER PRESSURE CARTRIDGE WOULD CAUSE
FRACTURE OF THE FWD SEPARATION BOLT WHICH WOULD SEPARATE THE
ORBITER STRUCTURALLY FROM THE ET AT THE FWD ATTACH POINT.
PREMATURE STRUCTURAL SEP_TION OF THE ORBITER AND ET WOULD
PRODUCE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS FROM UNCONTROLLED FORCES APPLIED IN
UNCONTROLLED DIRECTIONS WHICH COULD TEAR APART THE ORBITER.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4655
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FRANGIBLE NUT
PREMATURE FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
AFT SEPARATION (i LEFT/I RIGHT)
FRANGIBLE NUT
(i LEFT/I RIGHT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MCI14-0018-0007, SKD26100099-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE FRACTURE OF THE FRANGIBLE NUT WOULD THEREBY SEPARATE
THE ORBITER STRUCTURALLY FROM _H E ET AT THAT ATTACH POINT.
PREMATURE STRUCTURAL SEPARATION OF THE ORBITER AND ETAT AN AFT
ATTACH POINT WOULD PRODUCE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS FROM UNCONTROLLED
FORCES BEING APPLIED IN UNCONTROLLED DIRECTIONS WHICH COULD TEAR
APART THE ORBITER.
REFER TO IOA FMEA 4652. WHETHER THE FAILURE WERE CAUSED BY
PREMATURE DETONATION OF A DETONATOR OR STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
FRANGIBLE NUT, THE RESULTS ARE IDENTICAL.
REFERENCES: MCI14-0018
B
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/23/87
SUBSYSTEM:, PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4656
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: i/1
ABORT: I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR (S).
FRANGIBLE NUT
FAIL TO FRACTURE UPON RECEIVING SHOCK OUTPUT FROM
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ORBiTER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
AFT SEPARATION (i LEFT/1 RIGHT)
FRANGIBLE NUT
(I LEFT/I RIGHT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MCI14-0018-0007, SKD26100099-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE FRANGIBLE NUT TO FRACTURE UPON COMMAND WOULD
DISALLOW SEPARATION OF THE ET/ORBITER AT THAT AFT ATTACH POINT.
FAILURE OF AN ATTACH POINT TO DETACH WHEN REQUIRED WOULD PROBABLY
CAUSE A CATASTROPHIC COLLISION OF THE ETAND ORBITER.
ABORT LANDING OF THE ORBITER WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF THE ORBITER
COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE ET.
REFERENCES: MCI14-0018
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 i/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4657
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
FAILS TO FIRE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
AFT SEPARATION (I LEFT/I RIGHT)
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR/BOOSTER CARTRIDGE
(2 PER NUT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_UNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/iR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME453-0021-0009, SKD26100099-401
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE DETONATOR TO FIRE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE.
ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE BY EITHER DUAL REDUNDANT DETONATOR WOULD
SATISFACTORILY PERFORM THE INTENDED FUNCTION TO FRACTURE THE
FRANGIBLE NUT TO EFFECT ET/ORBITER SEPARATION AT THE AFT ATTACH
POINTS.
ANY DUAL FAILURE OF A PAIR OF MATED AFT ATTACH FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATORS WOULD CAUSE INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM THE
ET.
INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER FROM THE ET WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC453-0021
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-17
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
INADVERTENT OPERATION ! _ _
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
AFT SEPARATION (i LEFT/I RIGHT)
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR/BOOSTER CARTRIDGE
(2 PER NUT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: ME453-0021-0009, SKD26100099-401
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PREMATURE FIRING OF EITHER OF THE DUAL_REDUNDANT DETONATORS WOULD
SUFFICE TO INITIATE THE BOOSTERCHARGE TO FRACTURE THE FRANGIBLE
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NUT AND THEREBY SEPARATE THE ORBITER STRUCTURALLY FROM THE ET AT
THAT ATTACH POINT.
PREMATURE STRUCTURAL SEPARATION OF THE ORBITER AND ET WOULD
PRODUCE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS FROM UNCONTROL_ FORCES_BEING
APPLIED IN UNCONTROLLED DIRECTIONS WHICH COULD TEAR APART THE
ORBITER.
REFER TO IOA _ 4653. WHETHER THE FAILURE WERE CAUSED BY
PREMATURE DETONATION OF A DETONATOR OR SIMPLY STRUCTURAL FAILURE
OF THE FRANGIBLE NUT THE RESULTS ARE IDENTICAL.
REFERENCES: MC453-0021
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANAL_IS WORKSHEET ....
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT: i/I
4661 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR (S).
FRANGIBLE NUT
FAIL TO FRACTURE UPON RECEIVING SHOCK INPUT FROM
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
UMBILICAL PLATE SEPARATION
FRANGIBLE NUT
(3 PER PLATE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MCI14-0018-0003, SKD26100099-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ANY OF THE THREE FRANGIBLE NUTS ON EITHER THE LEFT OR
RIGHT SIDE TO FRACTURE UPON COMMAND WOULD PREVENT SEPARATION OF
THAT ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL PLATE.
FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY EFFECT ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL PLATE
SEPARATION WOULD PREVENT SAFE ORBITER/ET SEPARATION.
INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE ORBITER AND ET WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE CREW.
REFERENCES: MCI14-0018
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4662
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FRANGIBLE NUT
PREMATURE FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
UMBILICAL PLATE SEPARATION
FRANGIBLE NUT
(3 PER PLATE)
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/I RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MCI14-0018-0003, SKD26100099-201
CAUSES : HIGH TEMPERATURE _ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE FRACTURE OF ANY ONE OF THE THREE FRANGIBLE NUTS COULD
VIOLATE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE ORBITER AND ET UMBILICAL
PLATES AT 02 AND H2 VALVE SEPARATION P_E. _
LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AT THE ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL PLATE
SEPARATION PLANE COULD RESULT IN PREMATURE SEPARATION WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW. _........ _.....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8 
PYROTECHNICS
4663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR
FAIL TO FIRE OR REDUCED OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
UMBILICAL PLATE SEPARATION
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR
(2 PER NUT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: _ /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC453-0021-0009, SKD26100094
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE DETONATOR OF A GIVEN PAIR WouLD NOT BE DETECTABLE.
EITHER DUAL REDUNDANT DETONATOR IS CAPABLE OF PERFORM THE
INTENDED FUNCTION TO FRACTURE ITS FRANGIBLE NUT TO EFFECT PLATE
SEPARATION.
ANY DUAL FAILURE OF A MATED PAIR OF DETONATORS COULD CAUSE
INABILITY TO EFFECT UMBILICAL PLATE SEPARATION.
INABILITY TO EFFECT SEPARATION OF EITHER UMBILICAL PLATE WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC453-0021
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4664
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DETONATOR
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ORBITER/EXTERNAL TANK (ET) SEPARATION MECHANISMS PYROS
UMBILICAL PLATE SEPARATION
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR
(2 PER NUT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: I/I TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC453-0021-0009, SKD26100094
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE OPERATION OF ANY DETONATOR WOULD CAUSE FRACTURE OF THE
RESPECTIVE FRANGIBLE NUT. THERE ARE THREE NUTS STRUCTURALLY
TYING EACH (I LEFT/I RIGHT) UMBILICAL PLATE.
FAILURE OF ANY ONE OF THE SIX NUTS WOULD REDUCE STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY AND POSSIBLY BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW LOSS OF 02 OR H2
WHICH COULD CAUSE FIRE.
ULTIMATELY THE PREMATURE FRACTURE OF ONE OF THE SIX FRANGIBLE
NUTS COULD LEAD TO OTHER FAILURES THAT COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC453-0021
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT: I/i
4701 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
FAIL TO FUNCTION UPON RECEIVING NOMINAL PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
(DUAL PRESSURE CARTRIDGES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0024-0001, SKD26100105-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL _LFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEVERING THE ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT JETTISON
OF THE RR ANTENNA IF REQUIRED.
INABILITY TO STOW OR JETTISON THE ANTENNA COULD PREVENT PAYLOAD
BAY DOOR CLOSING.
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC325-0024
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Is/s7
PYROTECHNICS
4702
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
INADVERTENT_OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
(DUAL PRESSURE CARTRIDGES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0024-0001, SKD26100105-201
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
WOULD SEVER THE ELEgTRICALUMBILICAL. _!_
UNTIMELY SEVERING OF THE ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL WOULD DISABLE ANY
USE OF THE ANTENNA.
LOSS OF RENDEZVOUSRADAR WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: MC325-0024
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z2/is/sv
PYROTECHNICS
4703
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
FAIL TO FUNCTION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0024-0002, SKD26100105-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE CARTRIDGE FAILING WOULD NOT PREVENT OPERATION OF THE
GUILLOTINE ASSY. SEVERING THE ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL IS REQUIRED
TO EFFECT JETTISON OF THE RR ANTENNA IF REQUIRED.
INABILITY TO STOW OR JETTISON THE ANTENNA COULD PREVENT PAYLOAD
BAY DOOR CLOSING.
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC325-0024
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Is/sv
PYROTECHNICS
4704
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER: MC325-0024-0002, SKD26100105-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELYOPERATION OF THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
woULD SEVER THE ELECTRICAL t_4_BILIC_L_ _ _ • :i _ _ii_ _i
UNTIMELY SEVERING OF THE ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL WOULD DISABLE ANY
USE OF THE ANTENNA.
LOSS OF RENDEZVOUS RADAR WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: MC325-0024
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-26
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/1.8/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT: i/i
4705 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
RELEASE NUT
FAIL TO FUNCTION UPON RECEIVING NOMINAL PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
RELEASE NUT
(DUAL PRESSURE CARTRIDGES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT .... HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME325-0025-0001, SKD26100105-501
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SEPARATE THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA WHEN IT CANNOT
BE SAFELY AND PROPERLY STOWED WOULD PREVENT CLOSURE OF THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS.
IF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CANNOT BE CLOSED THEN DEORBIT CANNOT BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
IF SAFE DEORBIT CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED LOSS OF THE VEHICLE/CREW
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: MC325-0025
w
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
PYROTECHNICS
4706
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELEASE NUT
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
RELEASE NUT
(DUAL PRESSURE CARTRIDGES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
ME325-0025-0001, SKD26100105-501
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT SEPARATION OF THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA DURING
ASCENT COULD PHYSICALLY DAMAGE THE ORBITER AND PAYLOADS.
DEPENDING ON THE LEVEL OF THE PHYSICAL/STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE
ORBITER AND PAYLOADS, POSSIBLE CAUSE LOSS OF THE
PAYLOADS/ORBITER/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: MC325-0025
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
PYROTECHNICS
4707
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/!R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
FAIL TO FUNCTION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
2) RELEASE NUT
3) PRESSURE CARTRIDGES (2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME325-0025-0003, SKD26100105-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BOTH WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE FAILURE OF RELEASE NUT
WOULD NOMINALLY OCCUR. INABILITY TO RELEASE THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR
ANTENNA WHEN IT CANNOT BE SAFELY AND PROPERLY STOWED WOULD
PREVENT CLOSURE OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS.
INABILITY TO PROPERLY CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORSWOULD ENDANGER
SAFE DEORBIT.
IF SAFE DEORBIT CANNOTT BE ACCOMPLISHED, LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: MC325-0025
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
PYROTECHNICS
4708
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
RELEASE NUT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGES (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LiFTOFF : I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/!
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME325-0025-0003, SKD26100105-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERAT_EENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT SEPARATION OF THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA DURING
ASCENT COULD PHYSICALLY DAMAGE THE ORBITER AND PAYLOADS.
DEPENDING ON THE LEVELOFTHE PHYSICAL/STRUCTURAL D_GETO THE
ORBITER AND PAYLOADS, POSSIBLE CAUSE LOSS OF THE
PAYLOADS/ORBITER/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: MC325-0025
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4751
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE
FAILS TO FUNCTION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE
(4 PER ARM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0021-0001, SKD26100104-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE RETRACTOR TO RELEASE WHEN
COMMANDED TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO JETTISON AN ARM
WHEN REQUIRED.
INABILITY TO JETTISON AN ARM WHEN REQUIRED COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC325-0021
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4752
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE
(4 PER ARM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2
LIFTOFF: _ i/i
ONORBIT: I/I
DEORBIT: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO".
HDW/FUNC
i/i
....i/r
i/l
i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0021-0001, SKD26100104-201
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF THE RMS ARM COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL/STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE TO THE ORBITER/PAYLOADS.
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE TO THE ORBITER POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: MC325-0021
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4753
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSy PYRO
FAILS TO FUNCTION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
RMS SHOULDER UMBILICAL SEPARATION
(i PER ARM) TYPE I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0022-0001, SKD26100103-201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE RMS SHOULDER UMBILICAL SEPARATION GUILLOTINE ASSY
TO RELEASE WHEN COMMANDED TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON AN ARM WHEN REQUIRED.
INABILITY TO JETTISON AN ARM WHEN REQUIRED COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: MC325-0022
m
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-33
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT:
4754 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
RMS SHOULDER UMBILICAL SEPARATION
(I PER ARM) TYPE I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: /NA_
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0022-0001, SKD26100103-201
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF THE RMS SHOULDER UMBILICAL SEPARATION
GUILLOTINE ASSY WHILE THE ARM IS IN USE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CONTROL OF THE ARM WITH POSSIBLE PHYSICAL/STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO
THE ORBITER/PAYLOADS
DEPENDING ON THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF DAMAGE TO THE ORBITER, LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
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REFERENCES: MC325-0022
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
PYROTECHNICS FLIGHT: i/i
4755 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSY
FAILS TO FUNCTION WHEN BOTH INITIATORS ARE FIRED.
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
RMS PEDESTAL UMBILICAL SEPARATION
GUILLOTINE ASSY
(3 PER ARM) TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0022-0002, SKD261100103-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE RMS PEDESTAL UMBILICAL SEPARATION GUILLOTINE ASSY
TO FUNCTION TO SEVER THE ELECTRICAL WIRE BUNDLE WOULD PREVENT
JETTISON OF THE ARM WHEN REQUIRED.
INABILITY TO JETTISON AN ARM WHEN REQUIRED COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW.
i
REFERENCES". MC325-0022
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4756
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GUILLOTINE ASSY
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W, W, ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD RETENTION & DEPLOY
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING/RETENTION MECHANISM
GUILLOTINE ASSY
RMS PEDESTAL UMBILICAL SEPARATION
(3 PER ARM) TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0022-0002, SKD261100103-301
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPE-RATU_E_IROKTMENT,__i_AL/STRU_T_L
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
U_TIm_LY OPERATION OF THE RMS PEDESTAL UMBILICAL SEP_aATION
GUILLOTINE ASSY WOULD ABILITY TO STOW/DEPLOY TH__ _ _!_ !_
INABILITY TO DELOY THE ARM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
INABILITY TO STOW THE ARM WOULD REQUIRE THE ARM BE JETISSONED.
REFERENCES: MC325-0022
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4801
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTER WINDOW ASSY
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
2 ) EMERGENCY EGRESS
3) OUTER WINDOW ASSY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT_ /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER: VO70-553302
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE PROVIDED IN
SITUATIONS WHERE IT IS NEEDED.
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
WHEN REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: VO70-553302
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-37
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/23/87
PYROTECHNICS
4802
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i ,
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INNER WINDOW ASSY
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
2) EMERGENCY EGRESS
3) INNER WINDOW ASSY
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA .......RTLS: /NA'_
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_ING/SAFING: '_ I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-553303
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L_LFUNCTION, CO_OSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE PROVIDED IN
SITUATIONS WHERE IT IS NEEDED.
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
WHEN REQUIRED. ....._! _ .....................
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REFERENCES: VO70-553302
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4803
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
- FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM
REDUCED OR NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
EMERGENCY EGRESS
ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0004
CAUSES: MEC_iCAL/ST_UCT_L__CTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANT FAILURE OF ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS CAPABILITY IN SITUATIONS WHERE IT IS
NEEDED.
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
WHEN REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: MC325-0004
w
REPORT DATE 01/05/88 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDACID: 4804
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INITIATOR ASSY PYRO
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYSLEAD: ROBINSON
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
2) EMERGENCY EGRESS
3) INITIATOR ASSY PYRO
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR .....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0005-0003,-0005
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
REDUNDANT FAILURE OF WINDOW SE_NCE FUNCTION _ _ _:_ _.................. COULD SULT IN
LOSS OF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS CAPABILITY IN SITUATIONS WHERE IT
IS NEEDED.
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
WHEN REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: MC325-0005
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PYROTECHNICS , FLIGHT:
4805 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
0.3-SEC TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE ASSY
NO OUTPUT, EXCESSIVE DELAY OF CARTRIDGE FIRING.
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
EMERGENCY EGRESS
0.3 SEC TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0004-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL DETERIORATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD RESULT IN EXCESSIVE TIME BEFORE MAKING CREW EMERGENCY
EGRESS POSSIBLE.
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
IN TIME WHEN REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: MC325-0004
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
PYROTECHNICS
4806
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRU BULKHEAD INITIATOR
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW STATION & EQUIPMENT
EMERGENCY EGRESS
THRU BULKHEAD INITIATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA .... RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC325-0004-0003, -0023, SKD26100108-301, -401
7
CAUSES:HIGHT  TURE EmIIR0 NT. MEC  CAL/S R eTURAL
MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL
DETERIORATION. ___
EFFECTS/RATIONALE .•
DUAL FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS
LOSS OF CREW COULD RESULT IF EMERGENCY CREW EGRESS NOT AVAILABLE
WHEN REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: MC325-0004
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
I
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4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
4651
4652
4653
4654
4655
4656
4657
4658
4661
4662
4663
4664
1/1
2/IR
i/I
211R
2/IR
I/i
i/I
i/i
i/I
i/i
1/1
2/ZR
i/i
I/i
i/i
2/IR
i/I
i/i
i/i
211R
i/i
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
SHEAR BOLT
SHEAR BOLT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FRANGIBLE NUT
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
FRANGIBLE NUT
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR
DETONATOR
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
PREMATURE BOLT FRACTURE
FAILS TO FRACTURE
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
PREMATURE FRACTURE
FAILS TO FRACTURE
FAILS TO FIRE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FRACTURE
PREMATURE FRACTURE
FAILS TO FIRE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
D-I
MDAC-ID
4701
4702
4703
4704
4705
4706
4707
4708
FLIGHT
1/z
2/2
1/i
2/2
1/1
1/1
211R
i/i
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
GUILLOTINE ASSY,
PYROTECHNIC
GUILLOTINE ASSY,
PYROTECHNIC
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
RELEASE NUT
RELEASE NUT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
r
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4751
4752
4753
4754
4755
4756
1/1
1/1
1/z
1/1
1/1
2/2
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR
ARM RELEASE
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR
ARM RELEASE
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
GUILLOTINE ASSY
GUILLOTING ASSY
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
m
g
i
mm
m
48ol
4802
48O3
4804
4805
4806
1/1
1/z
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
OUTER WINDOW ASSY FAILS TO OPEN
OUTER WINDOW ASSY FAILS TO OPEN
ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM REDUCED OR NO OUTPUT
INITIATOR ASSY PYRO
0.3-SEC TIME DELAY
CARTRIDGE ASSY
THRU BULKHEAD INITIATOR
D-2
NO OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT, EXCESSIVE
DELAY OF CART FIRING
NO OUTPUT
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